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The Issue of Relevance in

R. v. Seaboyer and Gayme 1
Catherine Cogswell*
The myth is that a 'bad woman' is incapable of being
raped ... we have to deal with the myth that the credibility of a 'bad woman' is immediately in question. I was
·never sure what that phrase meant. As a lawyer, all I
knew was that it was of benefit to hurl as much dirt as
possible in the direction of such a woman hoping that
some of it would stick and that the jury would disbelieve
what she said.2
In the recent R. u. Seaboyer and Gayme3 decision, the Supreme
Court of Canada, in a decision split seven to two ruled that Section 276
of the Criminal Code4 was unconstitutional. Section 276 had restricted
the right of defence counsel, in a trial for a sexual offence, to crossexamine and lead evidence of a complainant's sexual conduct on other
occasions. The majority of the court ruled that this Section violated the
accused's right to a fair trial guaranteed in Sections 7 and ll(d) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms5.
The fundamental issue in the Seaboyer and Gayme appeals was
the evidentiary relevance of the past and/or present sexual activity of a
complainant in a trial for sexual assault. In this commentary, I will
outline the reasoning and mode of analysis of both the majority and
dissent on the issue of relevance. I will focus on the decision's turning
point: the majority's lack of reference to empirical evidence, social
science research, and feminist legal scholarship as compared to the
dissenting judges' reliance on such material as the starting point for
their analysis.

Factual Background
The Seaboyer and Gayme appeals arose from two separate
events in Ontario. Both matters involved the same primary issues. As
a result, the two appeals were joined at the Ontario High Court of Justice
level.
In Seaboyer, the accused was charged with sexual assault of a
woman with whom he had been drinking in a bar. At the preliminary
hearing, the judge refused to allow the accused to cross-examine the
complainant on her sexual conduct on other occasions. In Gayme, the
complainant was fifteen years old, the accused eighteen, and the two
were school acquaintances. The Crown alleged that the accused sexually
assaulted the complainant at school. The accused raised the defence of
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consent or, in the alternative, honest but mistaken belief in consent. He
argued that there had been no sexual assault and that the complainant
had been the aggressor. At the preliminary hearing, the accused sought
to present evidence and cross-examine the complainant on her prior and
subsequent sexual conduct. The preliminary judge refused to allow this
evidence.
Both Gayme and Seaboyer appealed these decisions on the
grounds that Sections 276 and 277 of the Criminal Code violated their
right to a fair trial guaranteed under Sections 7 and ll(d) of the Charter.

Decision of the Majority
In relation to the principal issue before the court, the majority,
in a decision written by Madame Justice McLachlin, found that evidence
of a complainant's past and present sexual activity, excluded by Section
276, could be relevant in a trial for sexual assault. Therefore, it was held
that Section 276 of the Criminal Code violated the accused's right to a
fair trial as guaranteed by Sections 7 and ll(d) of the Charter.
Madame Justice McLachlin discussed the rights inherent in
Sections 7 and ll(d) of the Charter, and considered the content of the
"principles of fundamental justice". She stated that the principles of
fundamental justice include a wide spectrum of interests involving those
of both the accused and society as a whole. These interests coalesce to
establish a fundamental right of our criminal justice system: the right
of the innocent not to be convicted. Madame Justice McLachlin maintained that a key aspect of this right is the right of the accused to make
a full answer and defence.
Madame Justice McLachlin categorized evidence of a complainant's sexual activity based on the use to which such evidence would be
put. The decision of the majority held that evidence of sexual activity
which is pertinent to the issues of a complainant's credibility and consent
to the acts in question is irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissable in a trial
for sexual assault. In contrast, evidence of a complainant's sexual
activity for any other evidentiary purpose could potentially be relevant.
Extrapolating from this evidentiary distinction based on use,
the majority ruled that Section 276's blanket exclusion of sexual activity
evidence was too all-encompassing and that certain components of such
evidence could be relevant and, thus, admissable. Admissability would
be determined in a voir dire. It was, therefore, held that Section 276
violated the accused's right to a fair trial.

Dissenting Opinion
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube, in the dissenting judgement,
held that evidence of a complainant's past and present sexual activity,
excluded by Section 276, is irrelevant in a sexual assault trial.
In stark contrast to the majority judgement, Madame Justice
L'Heureux-Dube began her analysis by setting out the context of the
constitutional issues before the court. Through reference to a large
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number of empirical sources, social science research, and feminist legal
scholarship, she established the context within which the issues must be
examined. This context includes the following:
1.

Sexual assault is a uniquely gender sensitive
issue because:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

in most cases the perpetrator is a man and the
target is a woman;
98.7 per cent of those charged with sexual assault are men;
all women live in fear of sexual assault and this
fear shapes women's daily lives; and
a large number of women are sexually assaulted.
(Most conservative estimates state that one in
five women will be sexually assaulted.)6

2.

There is a large gap between the reporting of sexual
assault and the actual extent of victimization. There are
a number of reasons why women do not report victimization including, the perception by victims that institutions will view victimization in a stereotypical and
biased fashion. 7

3.

Stereotypes, myths, and discriminatory beliefs regarding female complainants, sexual assault, women's sexuality, and rapists detrimentally affect many aspects of
our criminal justice system including:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

police conduct;
the Crown's decisions of which charges to prosecute;
judges and juries in their findings of fact and
perception of guilt of the accused; and
the development of substantive and evidentiary
law surrounding sexual assault.8

4.

Sexual assault has the lowest conviction rate of all
offences. (In 1973, the conviction rate for all crimes was
66. 7 per cent, whereas for 'rape', it was 39.3 per cent. In
1980, it was estimated that a rapist has only four
chances in one hundred of being arrested and convicted).9

5.

Victim 'misconduct' (such as mothering children outside
of marriage, having sexual relations with a boyfriend,
being a runaway or a drug dealer) has a direct impact on
the jury's perception of the guilt of the accused.IO
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6.

The likelihood of an accused being convicted by a jury
also decreases directly as more evidence is presented
regarding the prior sexual experiences of the complainant even where the information is not verified and/or
denied.11

7.

Stereotypes and discriminatory beliefs regarding victims of sexual assault are common in our society.12

Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube continued by asserting that,
once it is revealed that any notion of evidentiary relevance of a complainant's past or present sexual activity, in a trial for sexual assault, is based
on discriminatory beliefs, myths, and stereotypical notions of female
complainants, sexual assault, women's sexuality, and rapists, it, therefore, follows that evidence excluded by Section 276 is simply irrelevant.
She concluded, therefore, that Section 276 of the Criminal Code does not
violate the accused's right to a fair trial.
Reference to Empirical Evidence, Social Science Research, and
Feminist Legal Scholarship
The distinguishing feature of the dissenting opinion is its reference to empirical evidence, social science research, and feminist legal
scholarship. In contrast, the majority judgement is relatively void of
such considerations. There was almost no reference in this judgement
to empirical evidence and social science research regarding sexual
assault, nor to the feminist legal scholarship which helps to interpret
and explain both. This evidentiary gap prevented the majority from
analysing the extent to which notions of the relevance of evidence of a
complainant's past and present sexual activity rest on a foundation of
stereotypes, myths, and discriminatory beliefs, not the truth and facts of
present day reality. To the extent that the majority failed to examine the
issue of relevance within a proper context they failed to examine the
issue ofrelevance. Moreover, by beginning the analysis at the constitutional level and failing to establish an evidentiary foundation, the
Supreme Court of Canada, in essence, gives persons charged with sexual
assault a constitutional right to a fair trial and full answer and defence
which is based on stereotypes, myths, and discriminatory beliefs.
The distinguishing feature of the reasoning in the dissenting
judgement is the use of an evidentiary foundation as a beginning point
of analysis. This foundation was used to establish the extent to which
notions of relevance are informed by inaccurate assumptions about
sexual assault, female complainants, rapists, and women's sexuality. It
was also used to analyse how these inaccurate assumptions are utilized
within the criminal justice system by police, Crown attorneys, juries,
and judges.
At the time of writing this commentary, legislation was being
developed to replace the now unconstitutional Section 276 of the Criminal Code. It is hoped that this legislation will reflect the reasoning of the
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dissent, thereby according people charged with sexual assault offences
the constitutional right to a fair trial and full answer and defence based
on the truth and facts of the nature of sexual assault, female complainants, women's sexuality, and rapists, and not on stereotypes, myths, and
discriminatory beliefs.

*

Graduate law student, Dalhousie University.
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